In our age we are
witnessing how the materialistic realm of
things is being invaded by all sorts
of parasitary and subversive discourses on the
nature of existence, pure individualism
and materialism seem to have taken over every
single strata of western society,
the reader must know and understand that
reality is way broader than this,
there is a world beyond the impositions of
liberal individualism and a world
beyond the west itself. For this reason, I
must first explain the meaning of being, it
must be understood that all beings
in the world are contingent upon a first
cause, what we call Allah (SWT), the
entirety of things other than Allah (SWT), who
is a necessary existent are
nothing but different grades of His light.
Therefore, in the world there mainly
are two types of being, the Necessary Being,
whose existence is in the most
absolute form, and the contingent beings. It has long been a
commonplace to oppose the "a-historical"
spirit of Hellenism and the
historicity implied by a religion of
salvation; but in fact, it is this notion
of historicity that is equivocal, for the
truth is that "temporality"
is not synonymous with what we commonly
understand by "historicity.” For Shi’ite
orientalists and for western philosophers like
Heidegger this was the treatment
of temporality: Since Hegel's
phenomenology, we are used to opposing Nature
and History, History being the
world of man. In
fact, in the eyes of
our hokamâ and 'orafâ in Islam, Nature and History (what
we call them) both belong to the world of
becoming, both falling under the
empire of physis. This is why historical time,
which post-Hegelian philosophy
opposes to the becoming of Nature,
is in fact only a naturalization of time in
the eyes of the theosophy of
Shi'ism and Sufism, because it is inadequate
to speak of a fall of the Spirit
in time, meaning "in history": it would be
better to speak of the
fall of time itself in history. Only then can
we understand how the
internalization of meaning marks a reversal of
time. Here, there is a key term in Arabic (also used in is the word hikâyat, which means a "story", a "narrative", and as such an "imitation", a "repetition", as if the art of the historian were essentially like the art of the mime. This is because in fact all history that takes place in this visible world is the imitation of events first accomplished in the soul, "in Heaven", and this is why the place of hierohistory, of the gestures of sacred history, is not perceptible by the senses, because their meaning refers to another world. This intuition comes from the presentiment of these multiplied spaces, of these "octaves of universes" mentioned above (§ 2), and thus from the presentiment that the truth of any event must be grasped at the level of reality where this event really takes place (cf. all that will be said, finally, concerning the 12th Imâm). Only spiritual hermeneutics safeguards the truth of the hikâyat, the truth of the prophetic stories of the Bible and the Qur'an, because it grasps the spiritual meaning at the level at which the event takes place, in the time that is proper to it, the time of meta history. Whoever understands this will never feel the need to "demythologize" or "demythologize" the narratives of the Bible and the Qur'an, because, if these narratives are not history (like the profane history of Julius Caesar, for example), they are not myth either. Without doubt
Corbin saw in Heidegger's program an intent
comparable in part to that of the
Shi'ite gnostics whose struggle is to protect
and guard the realities of the
hidden Divine Trust that is the true reality
of Creation. The spiritual combat
of Shi'ism is against all the literalizing,
secularizing tendencies of any age.
While Heidegger's own strategy includes
breaking away from dogmatic theology,
it is clearly directed against narrow
materialism or any commonplace, everyday
interpretation of the world and human life.
His disdain for the opinions of das
Mann is, it seems clear, not merely an
ontological attitude, but a moral one as
well, and so his program seems in this sense
not so far from that of Corbin,
though he lacked the capacity to move into the
worlds in which Corbin was to
live. And from the point of view of Islamic
esotericism, ontology and ethics
are inseparable. The move to Islam
is a move out of linear, historical time.
Schooled in the Qor’an, Muslim
consciousness is spontaneously anhistorical,
that is to say, archetypical and
beyond the mere physical realm. Therefore, the
historical event evaporates and
all that is left is a vague memory submerged
in a story which has become a
living archetype. The Qor’an backs
off from that linear organization of time,
revelation, and history which became
the backbone of orthodox Christianity, and
remains the backbone of Western
culture after the death of God.... Islam is
committed by the Koran to project a
meta-historical plane on which the eternal
meaning of historical events is
disclosed.... History sub specie
aeternitatis Corbin's
philological, historical, and comparative
research is always the work of a man
devoted to Islam, a seeker. And he himself
emphasized the unity of his quest: What I searched for in Heidegger, what I understood thanks to Heidegger, is the same thing that I searched for and found in Islamic metaphysics.... But with this last, everything was situated from then on at a different level.. |